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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the problem of the strategic founda-
tion of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach. To this end, we
respecify a` la Cournot-Walras the mixed version of a model of simul-
taneous, noncooperative exchange, originally proposed by Lloyd S.
Shapley. We show, through an example, that the set of the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium allocations of this respecification does not coincide
with the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the mixed
version of the original Shapley’s model. As the nonequivalence, in a
one-stage setting, can be explained by the intrinsic two-stage nature of
the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept, we are led to consider a fur-
ther reformulation of the Shapley’s model as a two-stage game, where
the atoms move in the first stage and the atomless sector moves in
the second stage. Our main result shows that the set of the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium allocations coincides with a specific set of subgame
perfect equilibrium allocations of this two-stage game, which we call
the set of the Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium allocations.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the problem of the strategic foundation of the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium approach, initiated by Gabszewicz and Vial (1970), by
comparing it with the noncooperative market game approach, initiated by
Shapley and Shubik (1977).
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) is one of the first attempts to extend the anal-
ysis of oligopolistic interaction proposed by Cournot to a general equilibrium
framework. These authors introduced the concept of Cournot-Walras equilib-
rium for an economy with production, where firms are assumed to be “few”
whereas consumers are assumed to be “many.” Firms produce consumption
goods and distribute them - according to some preassigned shares - to con-
sumers, who are therefore endowed with the bundles of goods which they re-
ceive as shareholders of the firms plus some given initial bundles. Consumers
are then allowed to exchange their endowments among themselves and the
equilibrium prices resulting form these exchanges enable firms to determine
the profits associated with their production decisions. A Cournot-Walras
equilibrium is a noncooperative equilibrium of a game where the players are
the firms, the strategies are their production decisions and the payoffs are
their profits.
The denomination of the equilibrium concept introduced by Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972) comes from the fact that firms behave “a` la Cournot” in
making their production decisions while consumers behave “a` la Walras” in
exchanging goods. The line of research initiated by these authors raised some
theoretical problems (see also Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977), Roberts
(1980), Mas-Colell (1982), Dierker and Grodal (1986), among others). Gab-
szewicz and Vial (1972) were already aware that their concept of Cournot-
Walras equilibrium depends on the rule chosen to normalize prices and that
profit maximization may not be a rational objective of the firms.
Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991) introduced a Cournot-Walras equi-
librium concept for exchange economies where “few” traders, called the
oligopolists, behave strategically “a` la Cournot” in making their supply de-
cisions and share the endowment of a particular commodity while “many
small” traders behave “a` la Walras” and share the endowments of all the
other commodities. The oligopolists are allowed to supply a fraction of their
initial endowments. Taking prices as given, each oligopolist is able to deter-
mine the income corresponding to his supply decision and to choose a bundle
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of commodities which gives him the highest utility. All traders, behaving “a`
la Walras,” are then allowed to exchange commodities among themselves
until prices clear all the markets. A Cournot-Walras equilibrium is a non-
cooperative equilibrium of the game where the players are the oligopolists,
the strategies are their supply decisions and the payoffs are the utility levels
they achieve through the exchange.
The line of research initiated by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991) cir-
cumvented the theoretical difficulties of Gabszewicz and Vial’s model by
defining an equilibrium concept which does not depend on price normaliza-
tion (see also Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993), d’Aspremont et al. (1997),
Gabszewicz and Michel (1997), Shitovitz (1997), Lahmandi-Ayed (2001),
Bonnisseau and Florig (2003), among others).
Nevertheless, the whole Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach shares an-
other fundamental problem, stressed, in particular, by Okuno et al. (1980).
In fact, all the models mentioned above do not explain why a particular agent
behaves strategically rather than competitively.
Taking inspiration from the cooperative analysis of oligopoly introduced
by Shitovitz (1973), Okuno et al. (1980) proposed a foundation of agents’
behavior that considered the Cournot-Nash equilibria of a model of simulta-
neous, noncooperative exchange between large traders, represented as atoms,
and small traders, represented by an atomless sector. Their model belongs
to a line of research initiated by Shapley and Shubik (1977) (see also Dubey
and Shubik (1977), Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978), Mas-Colell (1982),
Amir et al. (1990), Peck et al. (1992), Dubey and Shapley (1994), among
others). In particular, Okuno et al. (1980) showed that large traders keep
their strategic power even when their behavior turns out to be competitive
in the cooperative framework considered by Shitovitz (1973).
Codognato (1995) and Codognato and Ghosal (2000b) generalized the
analysis of Okuno et al. (1980) by considering the mixed version of a model
originally proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and subsequently analyzed by Sahi
and Yao (1989). Within this framework, traders send out bids, i.e., quantity
signals, which indicate how much of each commodity they are willing to offer
for trade. Every bid of each commodity is tagged by the name of some other
commodity for which it has to be exchanged. The pricing rule requires that
a single price system, which equates the value of the total amount of bids of
any commodity to the value of the total amount available of that commodity,
is used to clear the markets.
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In particular, Codognato (1995) compared this model with the mixed
version of the model in Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991) and provided an
example showing that the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations
may not coincide with the set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations.
There could be two reasons for this result. The first is that the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium concept has an intrinsic two-stage nature which cannot
be reconciled with the one-stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the Shapley’s
model. The second is that, in the model by Codognato and Gabszewicz
(1991), the oligopolists behave a` la Cournot in making their supply decisions
and a` la Walras in exchanging commodities whereas, in the mixed version
of the Shapley’s model, the large traders always behave a` la Cournot. This
“twofold behavior” of large traders represents in fact a further problem with
the line of research introduced by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991).
In this paper, we provide a respecification a` la Cournot-Walras of the
mixed version of the Shapley’s model. More precisely, we assume that large
traders behave a` la Cournot in making bids, as in the Shapley’s model, while
the atomless sector behaves a` la Walras. Given the atoms’ bids, prices ad-
just to equate the aggregate net bids to the aggregate net demands of the
atomless sector. Each nonatomic trader then obtains his Walrasian demand
whereas each large trader obtains final holdings determined as in the Shap-
ley’s model. A Cournot-Walras equilibrium is a noncooperative equilibrium
of a game where the players are the large traders, the strategies are their
bids and the payoffs are the utility levels they achieve through the exchange
process described above. We show that, in the one-stage setting, our respec-
ification of the Shapley’s model generates a set of Cournot-Walras equilib-
rium allocations which does not coincide with the set of the Cournot-Nash
allocations of the mixed version of the original Shapley’s model. This con-
firms, within a different framework, the result obtained by Codognato (1995).
Since large traders always behave a` la Cournot in both the respecification a`
la Cournot-Walras and the original version of the Shapley’s model, we could
guess that our nonequivalence result is explained by the two-stage implicit
nature of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium.
For this reason, we introduce a reformulation of the Shapley’s model as
a two-stage game, where the atoms move in the first stage and the atomless
sector moves in the second stage, and proceed to check whether an equiv-
alence result can be obtained in this setup. In the Cournot-Walras model,
different atoms’ strategies leading to the same aggregate bids yield the same
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prices. On the other hand, in the two-stage Shapley’s model, there can be
subgames associated with atoms’ strategies summing to the same aggregate
bids that the atomless sector plays in different ways, so generating different
prices. In order to avoid this unreasonable behavior, we introduce a subgame
perfect equilibrium notion characterized by the fact that, in the second stage,
the atomless sector always uses the same strategies when the atoms send out
bids which sum to the same total amounts. We call it Pseudo-Markov per-
fect equilibrium for reasons which will become apparent in Section 4, where
we discuss the differences between the two notions of Pseudo-Markov and
Markov perfect equilibrium. Our main result then follows. The set of the
Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations and the set of the Pseudo-Markov
perfect equilibrium allocations of the two-stage game coincide. This theorem
reconciles the Cournot-Walras approach with the line of research initiated
by Shapley and Shubik (1977) and makes this approach immune from the
criticism by Okuno et al. (1980), as it provides an endogenous foundation of
strategic and competitive behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our re-
formulation of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept for mixed exchange
economies. In Section 3, we compare the Cournot-Walras, Walras, and
Cournot-Nash equilibrium concepts for mixed exchange economies in a one-
stage framework. In Section 4, we show our equivalence theorem in a two-
stage framework.
2 The model
We consider an exchange economy with large traders, represented as atoms,
and small traders, represented by an atomless sector. The set of traders is
denoted by T = T0∪T1, where T0 = [0, 1] is the set of small traders and T1 =
{2, . . . ,m + 1} is the set of large traders. Following Codognato and Ghosal
(2000b), it is possible to denote the space of traders by the complete measure
space (T, T , µ), where T is the σ-algebra of all µ-measurable subsets of T
and µ is the Lebesgue measure, when restricted to TT0 = {D ∩ T0 : D ∈ T },
and the counting measure, when restricted to TT1 = {D ∩ T1 : D ∈ T }. By
Propositions 3 and 4 in Codognato and Ghosal (2000b), it is straightforward
to show that the measure space (T0, TT0 , µ) is atomless and the measure space
(T1, TT1 , µ) is purely atomic; moreover, for each t ∈ T1, the singleton set {t}
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is an atom of the measure space (T, T , µ) (see, for instance, Aliprantis and
Border (1999), p. 357). A null set of traders is a set of Lebesgue measure 0.
Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout the paper. Thus,
a statement asserted for “all” traders, or “each” trader, or “each” trader in
a certain set, is to be understood to hold for all such traders except possibly
for a null set of traders. The word “integrable” is to be understood in the
sense of Lebesgue. Given any function g defined on T , we denote by 0g and
1g the restrictions of g to T0 and T1, respectively. Analogously, given any
correspondence G defined on T , we denote by 0G and 1G the restriction of
G to T0 and T1, respectively.
In the economy, there are l different commodities. A commodity bundle
is a point in Rl+. An assignment (of commodity bundles to traders) is an
integrable function x: T → Rl+. There is a fixed initial assignment w,
satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. w(t) > 0, for all t ∈ T , ∫T0 w(t) dµÀ 0.
An allocation is an assignment x for which
∫
T x(t) dµ =
∫
T w(t) dµ. The
preferences of each trader t ∈ T are described by an utility function ut :
Rl+ → R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
l
+ → R is continuous, strictly monotonic, strictly
quasi-concave, for all t ∈ T .
Assumption 3. u : T ×Rl+ → R, given by u(t, x) = ut(x), is measurable.
A price vector is a vector p ∈ Rl+. According to Aumann (1966), we
define, for each p ∈ Rl+, a correspondence ∆p : T → P(Rl) such that,
for each t ∈ T , ∆p(t) = {x ∈ Rl+ : px ≤ pw(t)}, and a correspondence
Γp : T → P(Rl) such that, for each t ∈ T , Γp(t) = {x ∈ Rl+ : for all y ∈
∆p(t), ut(x) ≥ ut(y)}. A Walras equilibrium is a pair (p∗,x∗), consisting
of a price vector p∗ and an allocation x∗, such that, for all t ∈ T , x∗(t) ∈
∆p∗(t) ∩ Γp∗(t).
In order to formulate the concept of Cournot-Walras equilibrium, we first
focus on the atomless sector’s behavior. By Assumption 2, for each p ∈ Rl++,
it is possible to define the small traders’ Walrasian demands as a function
0x(·, p) : T0 → Rl+ such that, for each t ∈ T0, 0x(t, p) = 0∆p(t) ∩ 0Γp(t). We
are now able to show the following proposition.
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Proposition. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the function 0x(·, p) is inte-
grable, for each p ∈ Rl++.
Proof. Let p ∈ Rl++. From Aumann (1966), we know that the function
0x(·, p) is a Borel measurable function since the correspondences 0∆p and
0Γp are Borel measurable and
0x(t, p) = 0∆p(t) ∩ 0Γp(t), for each t ∈ T0.
Moreover, 0x(·, p) is integrably bounded, since 0xi(t, p) ≤
∑l
j=1
pjwj(t)
pi
, i =
1, . . . , l, for all t ∈ T0. But then, by Theorem 2 in Aumann (1965), the
function 0x(·, p) is integrable.
Consider now the atoms’ strategies. Let e ∈ Rl2 be a vector such that
e = (e11, e12, . . . , ell−1, ell). A strategy correspondence is a correspondence
E : T1 → P(Rl2) such that, for each t ∈ T1, E(t) = {e ∈ Rl2 : eij ≥
0, i, j = 1, . . . , l;
∑l
j=1 eij ≤ wi(t), i = 1, . . . , l}. A strategy selection is an
integrable function e : T1 → Rl2 such that, for all t ∈ T1, e(t) ∈ E(t). For
each t ∈ T1, eij(t), i, j = 1, . . . , l, represents the amount of commodity i that
trader t offers in exchange for commodity j. Let E be the set of all strategy
selections. Moreover, let e\e(t) be a strategy selection obtained by replacing
e(t) in e with e(t) ∈ E(t). Finally, let pi(e) denote the correspondence which
associates, with each e ∈ E, the set of the price vectors such that
∫
T0
0x
j
(t, p) dµ+
l∑
i=1
∫
T1
eij(t) dµ
pi
pj
=
∫
T0
wj(t) dµ+
l∑
i=1
∫
T1
eji(t) dµ, (1)
j = 1, . . . , l.
Assumption 4. For each e ∈ E, pi(e) 6= ∅ and pi(e) ⊂ Rl++.
A price selection p(e) is a function which associates, with each e ∈ E, a price
vector p ∈ pi(e) and is such that p(e′) = p(e′′) if ∫T1 e′(t) dµ = ∫T1 e′′(t) dµ1.
For each strategy selection e ∈ E, we define atoms’ final holdings as a func-
tion 1x(·, e(·), p(e)) : T1 → Rl+ such that
1xj(t, e(t), p(e)) = wj(t)−
l∑
i=1
eji(t) +
l∑
i=1
eij(t)
pi(e)
pj(e)
, (2)
1Assumption 4 is quite strong. In our framework, it guarantees that the price-
correspondence is nonempty and that the atomless sector’s demand is well-defined. Anal-
ogous strong assumptions on the price-correspondence or the price selection are used in
all the previous models belonging to the Cournot-Walras approach.
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for all t ∈ T1, j = 1, . . . , l. Given a strategy selection e ∈ E, taking into
account the structure of the traders’ measure space, the Proposition, and
Equation (1), it is straightforward to show that the function x(t) such that
x(t) = 0x(t, p(e)), for all t ∈ T0, and x(t) = 1x(t, e(t), p(e)), for all t ∈ T1, is
an allocation.
At this stage, we are able to define the concept of Cournot-Walras equi-
librium.
Definition 1. A pair (e˜, x˜), consisting of a strategy selection e˜ and an alloca-
tion x˜ such that x˜(t) = 0x(t, p(e˜)), for all t ∈ T0, and x˜(t) = 1x(t, e˜(t), p(e˜)),
for all t ∈ T1, is a Cournot-Walras equilibrium, with respect to a price se-
lection p(e), if ut(
1x(t, e˜(t), p(e˜))) ≥ ut(1x(t, e(t), p(e˜ \ e(t)))), for all t ∈ T1
and for all e(t) ∈ E(t).
3 Cournot-Walras, Walras, and Cournot-
Nash equilibrium
In this section, we begin with investigating the relationship between the
concepts of Cournot-Walras and Walras equilibrium for the mixed exchange
economy defined above. Next, we compare the Cournot-Walras equilibrium
concept introduced in this paper with the Cournot-Walras equilibrium con-
cept proposed by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991). Finally, we introduce
the mixed version of the original Shapley’s model and the related notion
of Cournot-Nash equilibrium and we analyze the relationship between the
concepts of Cournot-Walras and Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a one-shot
structure.
Within a cooperative context, Shitovitz (1973) showed that, counterintu-
itively, the core allocations of a mixed exchange economy are Walrasian when
the atoms have the same endowments and preferences (but not necessarily
the same size). The following example shows that this unsatisfying result can
be avoided within a noncooperative setting. It analyzes an exchange economy
with two identical atoms facing an atomless continuum of traders and proves
that, in this economy, there is a Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocation which
is not Walrasian.
Example 1. Consider the following specification of an exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, where l = 2, T1 = {2, 3}, T0 = [0, 1],
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w(t) = (1, 0), ut(x) = lnx
1 + lnx2, for all t ∈ T1, w(t) = (1, 0), ut(x) =
lnx1 + lnx2, for all t ∈ [0, 1
2
], w(t) = (0, 1), ut(x) = lnx
1 + lnx2, for all
t ∈ [1
2
, 1]. For this economy, there is a Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocation
which does not correspond to any Walras equilibrium.
Proof. The only symmetric Cournot-Walras equilibrium is the pair (e˜, x˜),
where e˜12(2) = e˜12(3) =
1+
√
13
12
, x˜1(2) = x˜1(3) = 11+
√
13
12
, x˜2(2) = x˜2(3) =
1+
√
13
20+8
√
13
, x˜1(t) = 1
2
, x˜2(t) = 3
10+4
√
13
, for all t ∈ [0, 1
2
], x˜1(t) = 5+2
√
13
6
, x˜2(t) =
1
2
, for all t ∈ [1
2
, 1]. On the other hand, the only Walras equilibrium of
the economy considered is the pair (x∗, p∗), where x∗1(2) = x∗1(3) = 1
2
,
x∗2(2) = x∗2(3) = 1
10
, x∗1(t) = 1
2
, x∗2(t) = 1
10
, for all t ∈ [0, 1
2
], x∗1(t) = 5
2
,
x∗2(t) = 1
2
, for all t ∈ [1
2
, 1], p∗ = 1
5
.
The model introduced in Section 2 can be viewed as a respecification a`
la Cournot-Walras of a noncooperative market game first proposed by Lloyd
S. Shapley and next analyzed by Sahi and Yao (1989) and Codognato and
Ghosal (2000a). Here, we introduce a mixed version of the original Shapley’s
model, where the space of traders is as in Section 2.
We first consider traders’ strategy decisions. Let b ∈ Rl2 be a vector such
that b = (b11, b12, . . . , bll−1, bll). A strategy correspondence is a correspon-
dence B : T → P(Rl2) such that, for each t ∈ T , B(t) = {b ∈ Rl2 : bij ≥
0, i, j = 1, . . . , l;
∑l
j=1 bij ≤ wi(t), i = 1, . . . , l}. A strategy selection is an
integrable function b : T → Rl2 , such that, for all t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t). For
each t ∈ T , bij(t), i, j = 1, . . . , l, represents the amount of commodity i that
trader t offers in exchange for commodity j. Given a strategy selection b, we
define the aggregate matrix B¯ as B¯ = (
∫
T bij(t) dµ). Moreover, we denote by
b \ b(t) a strategy selection obtained by replacing b(t) in b with b(t) ∈ B(t).
Then, we are able to introduce the following definition (see Sahi and Yao
(1989)).
Definition 2. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is market clear-
ing if
p ∈ Rl++,
l∑
i=1
pib¯ij = p
j(
l∑
i=1
b¯ji), j = 1, . . . , l. (3)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar multiple,
price vector p satisfying (3) if and only if B¯ is irreducible. Denote by p(b)
the function which associates, with each strategy selection b such that B¯ is
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irreducible, the unique, up to a scalar multiple, market clearing price vector
p. Given a strategy selection b such that p is market clearing and unique,
up to a scalar multiple, consider the assignment determined as follows:
xj(t,b(t), p(b)) = wj(t)−
l∑
i=1
bji(t) +
l∑
i=1
bij(t)
pi(b)
pj(b)
,
for all t ∈ T , j = 1, . . . , l. It is easy to verify that this assignment is an
allocation. Given a strategy selection b, the traders’ final holdings are
xj(t) = xj(t,b(t), p(b)) if p is market clearing and unique,
xj(t) = wj(t) otherwise,
for all t ∈ T , j = 1, . . . , l.
This reformulation of the Shapley’s model for mixed exchange economies
allows us to define the following concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium (see
Codognato and Ghosal (2000b)).
Definition 3. A strategy selection bˆ such that ¯ˆB is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, b(t), p(bˆ \ b(t)))),
for all t ∈ T and for all b(t) ∈ B(t).
Codognato and Ghosal (2000a) showed that, in limit exchange economies,
the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations and the set of the Walras
equilibrium allocations of the Shapley’s model coincide. On the other hand,
Okuno et al. (1980) showed that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations
of a mixed exchange economy with two commodities are not Walrasian even
under those circumstances where the core turns out to be competitive (see
Shitovitz (1973)). It can be shown that an analogous result holds for the
Shapley’s model introduced in this section by simply verifying that the al-
location corresponding to a Cournot-Walras equilibrium in Example 1 also
correspond to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium as in Definition 3.
In effect, if we consider the mixed version of the original Shapley’s model,
all traders behave strategically but those belonging to the atomless sector
have a negligible influence on prices. The strategic behavior of the atomless
sector could consequently be interpreted as competitive behavior. On the
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other hand, in our version a` la Cournot-Walras of the Shapley’s model, the
atomless sector is supposed to behave competitively while the atoms have
strategic power. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to conjecture that the
set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations of our variant of the Shap-
ley’s model concides with the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations
of the mixed version of the original Shapley’s model. This conjecture turns
out to be false, as is shown by the following example.
Example 2. Consider the following specification of an exchange economy
satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, where l = 2, T1 = {2, 3}, T0 =
[0, 1], w(t) = (1, 0), ut(x) = lnx
1 + lnx2, for all t ∈ T1, w(t) = (1, 0),
ut(x) = lnx
1 + lnx2, for all t ∈ [0, 1
2
], w(t) = (0, 1), ut(x) = x
1 + lnx2, for all
t ∈ [1
2
, 1]. For this economy, there is a Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocation
which does not correspond to any Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The only symmetric Cournot-Walras equilibrium of the economy con-
sidered is the pair (e˜, x˜), where e˜12(2) = e˜12(3) =
−1+√37
12
, x˜1(2) = x˜1(3) =
11−√37
12
, x˜2(2) = x˜2(3) = −1+
√
37
14+4
√
37
, x˜1(t) = 1
2
, x˜2(t) = 3
7+2
√
37
, for all t ∈ [0, 1
2
],
x˜1(t) = 1+2
√
37
6
, x˜2(t) = 6
7+2
√
37
, for all t ∈ [1
2
, 1]. On the other hand, the
only symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the strategy selection bˆ, where
bˆ12(2) = bˆ12(3) =
1+
√
13
12
, bˆ12(t) =
1
2
, for all t ∈ [0, 1
2
], bˆ21(t) =
5+2
√
13
11+2
√
13
for all t ∈ [1
2
, 1], which generates the allocation xˆ1(2) = xˆ1(3) = 11+
√
13
12
,
xˆ2(2) = xˆ2(3) = 1+
√
13
22+4
√
13
, xˆ1(t) = 1
2
, xˆ2(t) = 3
11+2
√
13
, for all t ∈ [0, 1
2
],
xˆ1(t) = 5+2
√
13
6
, xˆ2(t) = 6
11+2
√
13
, for all t ∈ [1
2
, 1], where xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ, p(bˆ)),
for all t ∈ T .
4 Cournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame
perfect equilibrium
Example 2 shows the nonequivalence between Cournot-Walras and Cournot-
Nash equilibrium allocations in mixed exchange economies. As this nonequiv-
alence holds in a one-stage game, we are led to consider a multi-stage game.
In particular, given that the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept has an in-
trinsic two-stage flavor, it seems to be natural to analyze a two-stage game
where the atoms move in the first stage and the atomless sector moves in the
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second stage, after observing the first stage atoms’ moves. Therefore, we con-
sider the same exchange economy as in Section 3 and associate with it a two-
stage game with observed actions (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)), which
represents a sequential reformulation of the mixed version of the Shapley’s
model. We provide a theorem showing that the set of the Cournot-Walras
equilibrium allocations coincides with the set of a specific set of subgame per-
fect equilibrium allocations which we call the Pseudo-Markov perfect equi-
librium allocations of this game.
The game is played in the two stages 0 and 1. Consider now the traders’
actions. Let a ∈ Rl2 be a vector such that a = (a11, a12, . . . , all−1, all). We
denote by A0 an action correspondence in stage 0, defined on T , such that
A0(t) is the singleton “do nothing,” for all t ∈ T0, and A0(t) = {a ∈ Rl2 :
aij ≥ 0, i, j = 1, . . . , l; ∑lj=1 aij ≤ wi(t), i = 1, . . . , l}, for all t ∈ T1. We
denote by A1 an action correspondence in stage 1, defined on T , such that
A1(t) = {a ∈ Rl2 : aij ≥ 0, i, j = 1, . . . , l; ∑lj=1 aij ≤ wi(t), i = 1, . . . , l}, for
all t ∈ T0, and A1(t) is the singleton “do nothing,” for all t ∈ T1. An action
selection in stage 0 is a function a0, defined on T , such that a0(t) ∈ A0(t),
for all t ∈ T , where 1a0 is integrable. For each t ∈ T1, 1a0(t), i, j = 1, . . . , l,
represents the amount of commodity i that trader t offers in exchange for
commodity j. An action selection in stage 1 is a function a1, defined on T ,
such that a1(t) ∈ A1(t), for all t ∈ T , where 0a1 is integrable. For each
t ∈ T0, 0a1(t), i, j = 1, . . . , l, represents the amount of commodity i that
trader t offers in exchange for commodity j. Let S0 and S1 be the sets of
all action selections in stage 0 and stage 1, respectively, and let H0 and H1
be the sets of all stage 0 and stage 1 histories, respectively, where H0 = ∅
and H1 = S0. In addition, let H2 = S0 × S1 be the set of all final histories.
Given a final history h2 = (a0, a1), we define the aggregate matrix A¯ as
A¯ = (a¯ij) = (
∫
T0
0a1ij(t) dµ +
∫
T1
1a0ij(t) dµ). Then, we can introduce the
following definition (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Definition 4. Given a final history h2 = (a0, a1), a price vector p is market
clearing if
p ∈ Rl++,
l∑
i=1
pia¯ij = p
j(
l∑
i=1
a¯ji), j = 1, . . . , l. (4)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar multiple,
price vector p satisfying (4) if and only if A¯ is irreducible. Denote by p(h2)
the function which associates, to each final history h2 = (a0, a1) such that
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A¯ is irreducible, the unique, up to a scalar multiple, market clearing price
vector p. Given a final history h2 = (a0, a1) such that p is market clearing
and unique, up to a scalar multiple, consider the assignment determined as
follows:
xj(t,h2(t), p(h2)) = wj(t)−
l∑
i=1
0a1ji(t) +
l∑
i=1
0a1ij(t)
pi(h2)
pj(h2)
, for all t ∈ T0,
(5)
xj(t,h2(t), p(h2)) = wj(t)−
l∑
i=1
1a0ji(t) +
l∑
i=1
1a0ij(t)
pi(h2)
pj(h2)
, for all t ∈ T1,
j = 1, . . . , l. It is easy to verify that this assignment is an allocation. Finally,
given a final history h2 = (a0, a1), the traders’ final holdings are
xj(t) = xj(t,h2(t), p(h2)) if p is market clearing and unique,
(6)
xj(t) = wj(t) otherwise,
for all t ∈ T , j = 1, . . . , l.
Now, we define a strategy profile, s, as a sequence of functions {s0, s1},
where s0 is defined on T ×H0 and is such that s0(t,h0) ∈ A0(t), for all t ∈ T ,
and s0(·,h0) ∈ S0; s1 is defined on T ×H1 and is such that, given h1 ∈ H1,
s1(t,h1) ∈ A1(t), for all t ∈ T , s1(·,h1) ∈ S1. For each t ∈ T , let s(t, ·)
denote the sequence of functions {s0(t, ·), s1(t, ·)}, where s0(t, ·) : H0 → A0(t)
and s1(t, ·) : H1 → A1(t). We denote by s \ s(t, ·) = {s0 \ s0(t, ·), s1 \
s1(t, ·)} a strategy profile obtained by replacing s0(t, ·) in s0 and s1(t, ·) in
s1, respectively, with the functions s0(t, ·) and s1(t, ·). With a little abuse of
notation, given a strategy profile s, we denote by 1s0 and 0s1 the functions
defined, respectively, on T1 and T0, such that
1s0(t) = 1a0(t) = s0(t,h0), for
all t ∈ T1, and 0s1(t) = 0a1(t) = s1(t,h1), for all t ∈ T0, with h1 = s0(·,h0).
In addition, given a strategy profile s, we define the aggregate matrix S¯ as
S¯ = (¯sij) = (
∫
T0
0s1ij(t) dµ +
∫
T1
1s0ij(t) dµ). Then, given a strategy profile
s such that S¯ is irreducible, we denote by p(s) the function obtained by
replacing, in Equation (4), a¯ij with s¯ij, i, j = 1, . . . , l. Given a strategy
profile s such that p is market clearing and unique, up to a scalar multiple,
the allocation x(t, s(t), p(s)) is obtained by replacing, in (5), h2 with s and
0a1, 1a0, respectively, with 0s1, 1s0. Finally, the traders’ final holdings are
determined as in (6), by replacing h2 with s.
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We proceed now to consider the subgame represented by the stage 1 of
the game outlined above, given the history h1 ∈ H1. Given a strategy profile
s, the strategy selection s|h1 is a function, defined on T , such that, for each
h1 ∈ H1, s|h1(t) = s1(t,h1), for all t ∈ T . In addition, given a history
h1 ∈ H1 and a strategy profile s, we define the aggregate matrix S¯|h1 as
S¯|h1 = (¯sij|h1) = (∫T0 0sij(t)|h1 dµ + ∫T1 1h1ij(t) dµ). Then, given a history
h1 ∈ H1, and a strategy profile s such that S¯|h1 is irreducible, we denote
by p(s|h1) the function obtained by replacing, in Equation (4), a¯ij with
s¯ij|h1, i, j = 1, . . . , l. Given a history h1 ∈ H1 and a strategy profile s such
that p is market clearing and unique, up to a scalar multiple, the allocation
x(t, s|h1(t), p(s|h1)) is obtained by replacing, in (5), h2 by s|h1 and 0a1, 1a0,
respectively, with 0s|h1, 1h1. The traders’ final holdings are determined as in
(6), by replacing h2 with s|h1. Finally, given a history h1 ∈ H1, we denote
by s|h1 \ s(t)|h1 a strategy selection obtained by replacing s(t)|h1 in s|h1
with s(t)|h1 ∈ A1(t).
We are now able to define the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium for
the two-stage game above.
Definition 5. A strategy profile sˆ such that ¯ˆS|h1 is irreducible, for each
h1 ∈ H1, is a subgame perfect equilibrium if, for all t ∈ T ,
ut(x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs))) ≥ ut(x(t, s(t, ·), p(ˆs \ s(t, ·)))),
for all possible sequences of functions functions s(t, ·), and, for each h1 ∈ H1,
ut(x(t, sˆ|h1(t), p(ˆs|h1))) ≥ ut(x(t, s(t)|h1, p(ˆs|h1 \ s(t)|h1))),
for all t ∈ T and for all s(t)|h1 ∈ A1(t).
At this point, we have to deal with the following problem. In a Cournot-
Walras equilibrium, different atoms’ strategies leading to the same aggregate
bids generate the same prices. On the other hand, in a subgame perfect equi-
librium of the two-stage Shapley’s model, nothing assures that the atomless
sector reacts the same way to different histories leading to the same total
bids - thereby generating the same prices - even though atoms’ bids affect
payoffs only in the aggregate. In order to avoid this unreasonable behavior,
we introduce a subgame perfect equilibrium notion characterized by the fact
that, in the second stage, the atomless sector uses strategies invariant with
respect to different atoms’ bids summing to the same total amounts. To
14
this purpose, we denote by H1
?
(·) the partition of H1 such that, for each
h1
′ ∈ H1, H1?(h1′) = {h1′′ ∈ H1 : ∫T1 h1′′(t) dµ = ∫T1 h1′(t) dµ}. H1? is a
sufficient partition of the set of stage 1 histories, although it may not be the
coarsest sufficient partition required to define a Markov perfect equilibrium
(see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Maskin and Tirole (2001)). For this
reason, we call our equilibrium notion Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium.
It can be formalized as follows.
Definition 6. A subgame perfect equilibrium sˆ is a Pseudo-Markov perfect
equilibrium if, for all t ∈ T , sˆ1(t,h1′) = sˆ1(t,h1′′), whenever h1′′ ∈ H1?(h1′).
In order to prove our equivalence theorem, we shall introduce a final
assumption on the endowments and preferences of the atomless sector. We
denote by L the set of commodities {1, . . . , l} and by Rl+j>0 ⊂ Rl+ the set
of vectors in Rl+, whose j-th component is strictly positive. For each i ∈ L,
we consider the set Ti = {t ∈ T0 : wi(t) > 0}. Clearly, by Assumption 1,
µ(Ti) > 0. We say that the commodities i, j ∈ L stand in the relation C if
there is a measurable subset T ′i of Ti, with µ(T
′
i ) > 0, such that, for each
trader t ∈ T ′i , {x ∈ Rl+ : ut(x) = ut(y)} ⊂ Rl+j>0, for all y ∈ Rl++. In
addition, we use the following definition provided by Codognato and Ghosal
(2000a), to whom we refer for further details.
Definition 7. The set of commodities L is said to be a net if {〈i, j〉 : iCj} 6=
∅ and any pair of distinct vertices, i and j, of the directed graph DL(L,C)
are connected by a path.
Then, we can introduce this final assumption.
Assumption 52. The set of commodities L is a net.
We are now ready to state our equivalence theorem.
Theorem. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, (i) if (e˜, x˜) is a Cournot-
Walras equilibrium with respect to the price selection p(e), there is a Pseudo-
Markov perfect equilibrium s˜ such that x(t, p(e˜)) = x(t, s˜(t), p(˜s)), for all
2This is the weakest assumption which allows all traders to have boundary endow-
ments and indifference curves that intersect the boundary of the consumption set, and
which guarantees that, with an atomless continuum of traders, the set of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium allocations of the Shapley’s model and the set of the Walras equilibrium
allocations coincide (for a proof, see Codognato and Ghosal (2000a)). It is related to the
irreducibility assumption on traders’ endowments and preferences used by Gale (1960) in
the more specific framework of linear exchange economies
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t ∈ T ; (ii) if sˆ is a Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium, there are a strategy
selection eˆ and a price selection p(e) such that the pair (eˆ, xˆ), where xˆ(t) =
x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) = 0x(t, p(eˆ)), for all t ∈ T0, and xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) =
1x(t, eˆ(t), p(eˆ)), for all t ∈ T1, is a Cournot-Walras equilibrium with respect
to the price selection p(e).
Proof. (i) Let (e˜, x˜) be a Cournot-Walras equilibrium with respect to the
price selection p(e). Let p(h1) denote a function obtained by replacing, in
the price selection p(e), each strategy selection e with a history h1 such
that h1(t) = e(t), for all t ∈ T1. Consider now a history h1 ∈ H1. As,
by assumption, p(h1) À 0, Assumption 2 implies that p(h1)0x(t, p(h1)) =
p(h1)w(t), for all t ∈ T0. But then, by Lemma 5 in Codognato and Ghosal
(2000a), for all t ∈ T0, there exist λj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , l, ∑lj=1 λj = 1, such
that
0xj(t, p(h1)) = λj
∑l
j=1 p
j(h1)wj(t)
pj(h1)
, j = 1, . . . , l.
Define now a function λ : T0 → Rl+ such that λj(t) = λj(t), j = 1, . . . , l, for
all t ∈ T0. Let s˜|h1 denote a function, defined on T , such that s˜(t)|h1 ∈ A1(t),
for all t ∈ T , and 0s˜ij(t)|h1 = wi(t)λj(t), i, j = 1, . . . , l, for all t ∈ T0. It is
straightforward to show that the function 0s˜|h1 is integrable. We want now
to show that the matrix ¯˜S|h1 = (¯˜sij|h1) = (∫T0 0s1ij(t)|h1 dµ+ ∫T1 1h1ij(t) dµ)
is irreducible. Let i, j ∈ L be two commodities which stand in the relation
C. Consider a trader t ∈ T ′i . First, observe that p(h1)w(t) > 0 since,
by assumption, p(h1) À 0. This, together with Assumption 2, implies that
0x(t, p(h1)) > 0 and, given that the commodities i and j stand in the relation
C, that 0xj(t, p(h1)) > 0. Consider now the matrix S¯L|h1 = (¯sLij|h1) such
that s¯Lij|h1 =
∫
T ′i
wi(t)λj(t) dµ, if iCj, and s¯Lij|h1 = 0, otherwise. If iCj,
s¯Lij|h1 > 0, since, for each t ∈ T ′i , wi(t) > 0 and λj(t) > 0. But then, the
matrix ¯˜S|h1 is irreducible as it is such that ¯˜sij|h1 ≥ s¯Lij|h1, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
and the matrix S¯L|h1, by Assumption 5 and by the argument used in the
proof of Theorem 2 in Codognato and Ghosal (2000a), is irreducible. Since
it is easy to verify that
0xj(t, p(h1)) = wj(t)−
l∑
i=1
s˜ji(t)|h1 +
l∑
i=1
s˜ij(t)|h1 p
i(h1)
pj(h1)
,
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for all t ∈ T0, j = 1, . . . , l, and as p(h1) satisfies Equation (1), we have∫
T0
wj(t) dµ−
l∑
i=1
∫
T0
s˜ji(t)|h1 dµ+
l∑
i=1
∫
T0
s˜ij(t)|h1 dµp
i(h1)
pj(h1)
+
l∑
i=1
∫
T1
h1ij(t) dµ
pi(h1)
pj(h1)
=
∫
T0
wj(t) dµ+
l∑
i=1
∫
T1
h1ji(t) dµ,
j = 1, . . . , l. This implies that
l∑
i=1
pi(h1 )¯˜sij|h1 = pj(h1)(
l∑
i=1
¯˜sji|h1), j = 1, . . . , l,
and, consequently, by Equation (4), that p(h1) = p(˜s|h1). It is then straight-
forward to verify that 0xj(t, p(h1)) = xj(t, s˜(t)|h1, p(˜s|h1)), for all t ∈ T0,
j = 1, . . . , l, 1xj(t,h1(t), p(h1)) = xj(t, s˜(t)|h1, p(˜s|h1)), for all t ∈ T1,
j = 1, . . . , l. It remains now to show that no trader t ∈ T , in stage 1, has
an advantageous deviation from s˜(t)|h1. This is trivially true for all t ∈ T1.
Suppose now that there exist a trader t ∈ T0 and an action s(t)|h1 ∈ A1(t)
such that
ut(x(t, s(t)|h1, p(˜s|h1 \ s(t)|h1))) > ut(x(t, s˜(t)|h1, p(s|h1))).
Since, as an immediate consequence of Definition 4, p(˜s|h1 \ s(t)|h1) =
p(˜s|h1), the last inequality implies that
ut(x(t, s(t)|h1, p(h1))) > ut(0x(t, p(h1))).
As p(h1)x(t, s(t)|h1, p(h1)) = p(h1)w(t), this implies that 0x(t, p(h1)) 6∈
∆p(h1)(t) ∩ Γp(h1)(t), a contradiction. Let now h˜1 be a history such that
h˜1(t) = e˜(t), for all t ∈ T1, and let s˜ be a strategy profile such that, for all
t ∈ T , s˜0(t,h0) = h˜1(t) and s˜1(t,h1) = s˜(t)|h1, for each h1 ∈ H1. Then,
p(e˜) = p(˜s) and 0xj(t, p(e˜)) = xj(t, s˜(t), p(˜s)), for all t ∈ T0, j = 1, . . . , l,
1xj(t, e˜(t), p(e˜)) = xj(t, s˜(t), p(˜s)), for all t ∈ T , j = 1, . . . , l. Moreover,
since p(h1) is a price selection, it follows that p(h1
′
) = p(h1
′′
) whenever
h1
′′ ∈ H1?(h1′). This implies that, for all t ∈ T , s1(t,h1′) = s1(t,h1′′), when-
ever h1
′′ ∈ H1?(h1′). In order to show that s˜ is a Pseudo-Markov perfect
equilibrium, it remains now to show that no trader t ∈ T has an advantageous
deviation from s˜. As, for each trader t ∈ T0, p(˜s\s(t, ·)) = p(˜s|h˜1\s(t, h˜1)|h˜1),
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it is straightforward consequence of the previous discussion that no trader
t ∈ T0 has an advantageous deviation from s˜. Suppose that there exists a
trader t ∈ T1 and a sequence of functions s(t, ·) such that
ut(x(t, s˜ \ s(t, ·), p(˜s \ s(t, ·)))) > ut(x(t, s˜(t), p(˜s))).
Let h˜1 \ h(t) be a history obtained by replacing h˜1(t) in h˜1 with h(t) =
s0(t,h0) and let e˜ \ e(t) be a strategy selection obtained by replacing e˜(t) in
e˜ by e(t) = s0(t,h0). As p(e˜ \ e(t)) = p(˜s|h˜1 \ h(t)) = p(˜s \ s(t, ·)), the last
inequality implies that
ut(
1x(t, e(t), p(e˜ \ e(t)))) = ut(x(t, s(t, ·), p(˜s \ s(t, ·)))) >
ut(x(t, s˜(t), p(˜s))) = ut(
1x(t, e˜(t), p(e˜))),
a contradiction. (ii) Let sˆ be a Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium. Consider
a history h1 ∈ H1. First, it is straightforward to show that, for all t ∈ T0,
p(ˆs|h1)x(t, sˆ|h1(t), p(ˆs|h1)) = p(ˆs|h1)w(t). We want now to show that, for
all t ∈ T0, x(t, sˆ|h1(t), p(ˆs|h1)) = 0x(t, p(ˆs|h1)). Suppose that this is not the
case for a trader t ∈ T0. Then, by Assumption 2, there is a bundle z ∈ {x ∈
Rl+ : p(ˆs|h1)x = p(ˆs|h1)w(t)} such that ut(z) > ut(x(t, sˆ|h1(t), p(ˆs|h1)). By
Lemma 5 in Codognato and Ghosal (2000a), there exist λj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , l,∑l
j=1 λ
j = 1, such that
zj = λj
∑l
j=1 p
j (ˆs|h1)wj(t)
pj (ˆs|h1) , j = 1, . . . , l.
Let sij(t) = w
i(t)λj, i, j = 1, . . . , l. Since, as an immediate consequence of
Definition 4, p(ˆs|h1) = p(ˆs|h1 \ s(t)|h1), it is easy to verify that
zj = xj(t, s(t), p(ˆs|h1 \ s(t)|h1)), j = 1, . . . , l.
But then, we have
ut(x(t, s(t), p(ˆs|h1 \ s(t)|h1))) = ut(z) > ut(x(t, sˆ|h1(t), p(ˆs|h1))),
a contradiction. As the function x(·,h1(·), p(ˆs|h1)) is an allocation, we obtain
that ∫
T0
0x
j
(t, p(ˆs|h1)) dµ+
l∑
i=1
∫
T1
h1ij(t) dµ
pi(ˆs|h1)
pj (ˆs|h1) = (7)∫
T0
wj(t) dµ+
l∑
i=1
∫
T1
h1ji(t) dµ.
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Let now p(e) be a function which associates, with each e, the price vector
p(ˆs|h1), where h1 is such that h1(t) = e(t), for all t ∈ T1. First, let us notice
that, since sˆ is a Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium, we have p(ˆs|h1′) =
p(ˆs|h1′′) if ∫T1 h1′(t) dµ = ∫T1 h1′′(t) dµ and then p(e′) = p(e′′), if ∫T1 e′(t) dµ =∫
T1
e′′(t) dµ. Moreover, if we replace, in Equation (7), the history h1 with a
strategy selection e such that e(t) = h1(t), for all t ∈ T1, and the price p(ˆs|h1)
with the price p(e), it follows immediately that the function p(e) satisfies
Equation (1). Therefore, we can conclude that p(e) is a price selection. It also
follows immediately from the above argument that, for each history h1 ∈ H1,
xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) = 0x(t, p(eˆ)), for all t ∈ T0, and xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) =
1x(t, eˆ(t), p(eˆ)), for all t ∈ T1, where e is a strategy selection such that e(t) =
h1(t), for all t ∈ T1. Let now hˆ1 be a history such that hˆ1(t) = sˆ0(t,h0),
for all t ∈ T , and let eˆ be a strategy selection such that eˆ(t) = hˆ1(t), for all
t ∈ T1. As p(ˆs) = p(ˆs|hˆ1), xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) = 0x(t, p(eˆ)), for all t ∈ T0,
and xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) = 1x(t, eˆ(t), p(eˆ)), for all t ∈ T1. But then, in
order to show that the pair (eˆ, xˆ), where xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) = 0x(t, p(eˆ)),
for all t ∈ T0, and xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs)) = 1x(t, eˆ(t), p(eˆ)), for all t ∈ T1,
is a Cournot-Walras equilibrium with respect to the price selection p(e), it
remains to show that no trader t ∈ T1 has an advantageous deviation from
the strategy selection eˆ. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a trader
t ∈ T1 and a strategy e(t) ∈ E(t) such that
ut(
1x(t, e(t), p(eˆ \ e(t)))) > ut(1x(t, eˆ(t), p(eˆ))).
Let hˆ1 \ h(t) be a history obtained by replacing hˆ1(t) in hˆ1 with h(t) = e(t)
and let sˆ \ s(t) be a strategy profile obtained by replacing sˆ0(t, ·) in sˆ0 with
s0(t) = h(t). As p(ˆs \ s(t)) = p(ˆs|hˆ1 \ h(t)) = p(eˆ \ e(t)), the last inequality
implies that
ut(
1x(t, s(t), p(ˆs \ s(t)))) = ut(1x(t, e(t), p(eˆ \ e(t)))) >
ut(
1x(t, eˆ(t), p(eˆ))) = ut(
1x(t, sˆ(t), p(ˆs))),
a contradiction.
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